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Abstract
Beaucheˆne, Li, and Li (2019) show that ambiguous persuasion leads to new interim
equilibria with higher ex ante value for the Sender compared to the standard Bayesian
persuasion. However, in their equilibrium the strategy of the Receiver is in general
not ex ante optimal. This note, defines rectangular beliefs over the full state space
in the same setting as Beaucheˆne et al. (2019) and shows that given rectangular be-
liefs the Receiver behaves dynamically consistent. Hence, the interim equilibrium of
Beaucheˆne et al. (2019) is an ante equilibrium, as well.
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1 Introduction
Beaucheˆne, Li, and Li (2019), henceforth BLL, introduce ambiguity in the standard Bayesian
persuasion setting of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) by allowing the Sender to choose a
set of communication devices. Each communication device can generate a signal realiza-
tion or message that reveals information about an unknown (risky) state ω ∈ Ω. Sender
and Receiver only observe the signal realization without knowing which communication
device generated the signal realization. Therefore ambiguity about the communication de-
vice induces ambiguity about the risky state ω. BLL characterize conditions under which
the interim equilibrium under ambiguous persuasion leads to an higher ex ante expected
payoff of the Sender as Bayesian persuasion. They focus on interim equilibria since ambi-
guity leads to dynamically inconsistent behavior of the Receiver. But they use the ex ante
expected utility of the interim equilibrium to calculate the value of ambiguous persuasion
and to compare it with the value of Bayesian persuasion, even if the interim equilibrium
∗I would like to thank Frank Riedel for his comments and suggestions.
†Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics, 33615 Bielefeld, Germany
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is not an ex ante equilibrium. Furthermore, they define rectangularity for beliefs over Ω
and show that their definition of rectangularity can only be satisfied if ambiguity reduces
to risk. Therefore, they claim that there is no gain of ambiguous persuasion compared to
Bayesian persuasion if the players behave dynamically consistent.1
This note shows, that defining rectangularity over the full state space allows for rect-
angular ambiguous beliefs. These beliefs take the dependence of the ambiguous signal and
the ex ante risky state into account. Therefore, the Sender can gain from an ambiguous
strategy even if dynamic consistency is satisfied.
2 Model of Beaucheˆne, Li, and Li (2019)
We follow the model of BLL. The persuasion game consists of two players, a Sender (he)
and a Receiver (she). The utility of both players depends of the state of the world ω ∈ Ω
and an action a ∈ A chosen by the Receiver. We denote with u(a, ω) and ν(a, ω) the utility
of Receiver and Sender, respectively. Ω and A are compact subsets of the Euclidean space.
Ex ante the state ω is unknown and both players have the same prior state belief p0 ∈ ∆Ω
i.e. ex ante there is no ambiguity about the state.2 The Sender tries to persuade the
Receiver by choosing a signal that reveals information about the state. A signal consists
of a finite set of signal realizations or messages M and a set of communication devices
Π = {pik}k∈K .3 Each communication device is a distribution over the set of messages for
each ω ∈ Ω, i.e. pik(·|ω) ∈ ∆M for all ω ∈ Ω. We assume that pik have common support for
all k ∈ K. The only difference to the standard Bayesian persuasion setting is the fact that
the Sender chooses a set of communication devices instead of one communication device.
Which of the communication devices generates the observed message is ambiguous to the
Receiver and the Sender. After observing a message m, the Receiver updates his prior state
belief using Bayes’ rule. Since she does not know which communication device generated
the message, she updates p0 with respect to each communication device pik. This leads to
the following set of posterior state beliefs given the message m ∈M
Pm =
{
ppikm (·) ∈ ∆Ω : ppikm (·) =
p0(·)pik(m|·)∫
ω∈Ω p0(ω)pik(m|ω) dω
, pik ∈ Π
}
.
Sender and Receiver have maxmin preferences a` la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) i.e. they
maximize their worst case expected utility. BLL assume that the Receiver maximizes her
1See Proposition 5 of Beaucheˆne et al. (2019).
2Our definition of belief differs from the one of BLL. To avoid confusion we use the term state belief
whenever we refer to beliefs in the sense of BLL.
3Please note that we deviate from the model of BLL by defining Π as the set of communication devices.
BLL define Π as the convex hull of the set of communication devices. Since Sender and Receiver have
maxmin preferences, the minimization problems over {pik} or co
({pik}) coincide.
2
interim worst case expected utility given that message m was observed
U(a, Pm) = min
pm∈Pm
Epm(u(a, ω)). (1)
As usual in the persuasion literature, we assume that the Receiver chooses the Sender pre-
ferred action if she has multiple maximizers. We denote with aˆ(Pm) the (Sender preferred)
best response of the Receiver after observing message m. The Sender chooses the signal
(M,Π) that maximizes his worst case expected utility
sup
(M,Π)
min
pi∈Π
Ep0
[
Epi
[
ν(aˆ(Pm), ω)|ω
]]
.
BLL explore an interim equilibrium. Since the choice of the Sender is realized at the ex ante
stage, the interim and ex ante mazimization problem of the Sender coincide. However, the
interim best response of the Receiver is in general not ex ante optimal. Intuitively, ex ante
the Receiver can hedge against ambiguity by playing any strategy that is constant with
respect to the signal realization. The following example from BLL shows that ambiguity
can lead to an higher expected payoff for the Sender. Furthermore, we show that the
interim equilibrium strategy of the Receiver is not ex ante ante optimal.
Example 1 Assume that the Sender is a brand name drug producer. The Receiver is a
physician who can choose between prescribing the brand name drug (a = aB) or an generic
competitor of it (a = aG). The Sender always prefers that the Receiver prescribes the brand
name drug. The Receiver preferences depends of the state which reflects the effectiveness of
the generic drug. If the generic drug is effective (ω = ωe) the Receiver prefers the generic
drug if not (ω = ωi) she prefers the brand name drug. The payoffs of Sender and Receiver
are given by the following table.
ωe ωi
aB
aG
(1, 2) (1, 2)
(0, 3) (0,−1)
Figure 1: Payoffs (S,R)
Sender and Receiver have a common ex ante state belief p0 = P(ω = ωi) < 14 .
4 BLL
show that the optimal Bayesian persuasion signal is such that the set of messages consists
of two messages M = {i, e} and the communication device is given by
pi(e|ωe) = 1− 4p0
1− p0 = 1− pi(i|ωe)
4Please note, that we deviate from the Illustrating Example of BLL (page 317) by assuming uH = 3,
uL = −1 and c = 1, which is consistent with the payoffs in Example 2 of BLL.
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pi(e|ωi) = 0 = 1− pi(i|ωi).
Then, the ex ante expected payoff of the Sender given the optimal Bayesian persuasion
signal is P(m = i) · 1 + P(m = e) · 0 = 4p0 < 1.
Furthermore, they construct an ambiguous persuasion signal that leads to an higher
expected payoff of the Sender. Let M = {e, i} as before. The set of communication devices
Π = {pi, pi′} is given by a communication device that always reveals the true state and a
communication device that do the opposite, i.e.
pi(i|ωi) = 1 = 1− pi(e|ωi) pi(i|ωe) = 0 = 1− pi(e|ωe)
pi′(i|ωi) = 0 = 1− pi′(e|ωi) pi′(i|ωe) = 1 = 1− pi′(e|ωe).
Given this ambiguous communication device the interim state beliefs are Pm = {(0, 1), (1, 0)}
for m ∈ {e, i}. Due to the maxmin preferences the worst case interim belief for both mes-
sages always give probability 1 to the ineffective state ωi. Therefore, the Receiver choose
the brand name drug with probability 1. Then, the ex ante expected payoff of the Sender is
1, which is greater as the ex ante expected payoff under optimal Bayesian persuasion.
However, the ex ante expected payoff of the Receiver is given by
min
pi∈Π
∑
m∈{e,i}
(
pi(m|ωe) + pi(m|ωi)
)
Eppim
(
u(am, ω)
)
where am denotes her action after observing the messages m. If she chooses the brand
name drug independently of the signal that she will observe, her ex ante expected payoff
equals
2 · P(ω = ωe) + 2 · P(ω = ωi) = 2.
Her expected payoff if she always choose the generic drug is
3 · P(ω = ωe) + 1 · P(ω = ωi) = 3− 4p0.
Since p0 <
1
4
, the interim optimal strategy of always prescribing the brand name drug is
not ex ante optimal and the Receiver behaves dynamically inconsistent.
3 Dynamic Consistent Belief Formation Process
One way to rule out dynamically inconsistent behavior in dynamic settings with multiple
priors are rectangular belief sets as defined e.g. by Epstein and Schneider (2003) and Pahlke
(2018). Both paper define rectangular beliefs over the full state space. In this section
we show that defining beliefs over an adequate state space, allows the definition of non-
singleton rectangular belief sets. Then given a rectangular belief set the Receiver behaves
dynamically consistent and the interim equilibrium of BLL is an ex ante equilibrium and
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therefore a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
In the ambiguous persuasion setting M is part of the strategy of the Sender. The next
proposition shows that the Sender chooses without loss of generality M ⊂ A∪ b(A) where
b(A) is a duplicated set of A such that there exists a bijection b(·) between A and b(A).
Given this result, we can define rectangular ex ante beliefs over Ω× (A ∪ b(A)).
Proposition 1 Let (M,Π) ∈ argsup minpi∈Π Ep0 [Epi [ν(aˆ(Pm), ω)|ω]]. Then, there exist
(M ′,Π′) with M ′ ⊂ A ∪ b(A) where b(·) : A 7→ b(A) is a bijection between A and b(A) and
Π′ = {pi′1, pi′2} such that (M ′,Π′) generates the same value for the Sender as (M,Π).
The intuition of the result is as follows. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show that for
Bayesian persuasion it is without loss of generality that M ⊂ A. BLL show that ambigu-
ous persuasion increases the value for the Sender compared to Bayesian persuasion only if
the Sender uses a signal with synonyms. Synonyms are messages that copy the meaning of
another message i.e. they induce the same posterior state belief set or best response of the
Receiver. To allow the use of synonyms we have to duplicate the message space. Therefore
M ⊂ A ∪ b(A).
Proof of Proposition 1. Corollary 1 of BLL shows that there exists pi1 and pi2 such that
(M, {pi1, pi2}) generates the same value as (M,Π). Hence, we have to show that (M ′,Π′)
generates the same value as (M, {pi1, pi2}). We first look at the case where the Sender does
not use synonyms.
i) Sender does not use synonyms.
Since (M, {pi1, pi2}) does not use synonyms, there does not exist m,m′ ∈ M with
m 6= m′ such that aˆ(Pm) = aˆ(Pm′). Remember, that ppim denotes the posterior
state belief of the Receiver given the message m and the communication device pi.
Furthermore, aˆ(Pm) denotes Receivers best response given message m ∈ M and
the communication devices {pi1, pi2}. Since (M, {pi1, pi2}) does not use synonyms,
there exists at most one m ∈ M for each a ∈ A such that a = aˆ(Pm). We define
p¯ii(·|ω) ∈ ∆M ′ with M ′ ⊂ A such that
p¯ii(a|ω) =
{
pii(m|ω) if ∃m ∈M with a = aˆ(Pm)
0 otherwise .
Then, the posterior state belief ppiim equals the posterior state belief p
p¯ii
a if a = aˆ(Pm).
Therefore, (M, {pi1, pi2}) and (M ′, {p¯i1, p¯i2}) generate the same set of posterior state
beliefs and the same best response of the Receiver. Since the best response does not
change, the value of the Sender is the same for both signals.
i) Sender uses synonyms.
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If (M, {pi1, pi2}) uses synonyms we can split M in M1 and M2 such that there exist a
bijection between M1 and M2 and M1 ∪M2 = M . Then (M1, {pˆi1, pˆi2}) with
pˆii(m|ω) = pii(m|ω)∑
m∈M1 pii(m|ω)
defines a signal that does not use synonyms. Hence, as in case 1 there exists
(M ′1, {p¯i1, p¯i2}) with M ′1 ⊂ A that generates the same value as (M1, {pˆi1, pˆi2}). Similar
one can define the restriction of pii to M2 and find (M
′
2, {p˜i1, p˜i1}) with M ′2 ⊂ b(A), that
generates the same value as M2 and the restriction of pii to M2. Then, (M
′, {pi′1, pi′2})
with M ′ = M ′1 ∪M ′2 and
pi′i(a|ω) =
{
p¯ii(a|ω)
∑
m∈M1 pii(m|ω) if a ∈ A
p˜ii(a|ω)
∑
m∈M2 pii(m|ω) if a ∈ b(A)
generates the same value as (M, {pi1, pi2}).
Proposition 1 shows that without loss of generality we can assume that M ⊂ A∪ b(A).
Then, a strategy of the Sender (M,Π) is completely characterized by Π if we assume
that he chooses pik ∈ Π with common finite support on A ∪ b(A), i.e. supp(pik(·|ω)) =
supp(pij(·|ω)) ⊂ A ∪ b(A) for all ω ∈ Ω and j, k ∈ K and supp(pij(·|ω)) is finite. For the
rest of the paper we will use the term strategy of the Sender for such a Π. Furthermore
we denote with supp(Π) the support of pik ∈ Π for all k ∈ K.
3.1 Rectangular Beliefs
Given the results from the previous section we can define beliefs over the full state space
Ω× (A ∪ b(A)).
Definition 1 For a strategy Π of the Sender we define the set of ex ante beliefs of the
Receiver as
Φ0Π =
{
ρk ∈ ∆(Ω× (A ∪ b(A))) :∃pik ∈ Π s.t.
ρk(ω,m) =
{
p0(ω)pik(m|ω) if m ∈ supp(Π)
0 otherwise
∀k ∈ K
}
.
At the interim stage the Receiver observes a message m ∈ supp(Π). The information
structure of the game can be represented by the following partitions
F0 = Ω× (A ∪ b(A), )
F1 =
{
{Ω×m}m∈A∪b(A)
}
.
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Then, given an observation mˆ ∈ supp(Π) the Receiver updates his ex ante belief set prior-
by-prior using Bayes’ rule, i.e. she updates each prior belief in Φ0Π with Bayes’ rule
ρk|mˆ = ρk((ω,m)|mˆ) = p0(ω)pik(m|ω)∫
ω′∈Ω p0(ω
′)pik(m|ω′) dω
if m = mˆ and 0 otherwise. Then, the set of updated beliefs given mˆ is
Bay(Φ0Π|mˆ) = {ρk|mˆ with ρk ∈ Φ0Π}.
Please note that ρk((ω,m)|mˆ) = 0 for mˆ /∈ supp(Π). Furthermore, ρk((ω, mˆ)|mˆ) = ppikmˆ (ω)
for all ω. Therefore, Receivers maximization problem at the interim stage given our defi-
nition of beliefs is the same as in BLL.
To define rectangularity we need updated beliefs and marginal beliefs of observing
m ∈ A ∪ b(A). The marginal belief of observing m under ρk is
ρk(Ω,m) =
∫
ω∈Ω
ρk(ω,m) dω =
∫
ω∈Ω
p0(ω)pik(m|ω) dω
Now we can define rectangularity. Intuitively, using rectangular ex ante beliefs allows
each player to combine the common ex ante information p0 and their conjecture about the
strategy of the opponent taking their knowledge about the information structure of the
game into account.
Definition 2 The pasting of ex ante belief ρ¯ ∈ Φ0Π and a collection of updated beliefs
(ρ|mˆ)mˆ ∈×mˆ∈supp(Π) Bay(Φ0Π|mˆ) is defined as5
ρ¯ ◦ (ρ|mˆ)mˆ(ω,m) :=
∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ¯(Ω, mˆ)ρ(ω,m|mˆ) dmˆ
=
(∫
ω′∈Ω
p0(ω
′)p¯i(m|ω′) dω
) p0(ω)pi(m|ω)∫
ω′∈Ω p0(ω
′)pi(m|ω′) dω .
The set of ex ante beliefs is called rectangular (or stable under pasting) if it contains all
pasting of an arbitrary ex ante belief ρ¯ ∈ Φ0Π and arbitrary interim beliefs (ρ|mˆ)mˆ, i.e.
ρ¯ ◦ (ρ|mˆ)mˆ(·) ∈ Φ0Π
for all ρ¯ ∈ Φ0Π and (ρ|mˆ)mˆ ∈×mˆ∈supp(Π) Bay(Φ0Π|mˆ).
If Φ0Π is not rectangular one can always construct the smallest set which is rectangular and
contains Φ0Π. We call this set the rectangular hull and denote it with rect(Φ
0
Π). Further-
more, simple calculations show that Bay(Φ0Π|mˆ) = Bay(rect(Φ0Π)|mˆ). The same holds for
5Please note, that the pasting is always well defined due to the common support assumption. Further-
more, the second equality follows since ρ(ω,m|mˆ) = 0 if m 6= mˆ.
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the set of marginal beliefs under Φ0Π and under rect(Φ
0
Π). For a more detailed explanation
of the construction and the properties of the rectangular hull please see Pahlke (2018).
3.2 Dynamic Consistency
Finally, we show that rectangularity implies dynamically consistent behavior of the Re-
ceiver.
Proposition 2 Assume that the Receiver has rectangular ex ante beliefs. Then, the in-
terim equilibrium of BLL is an ex ante equilibrium, as well.
Proof. The Sender does not observe any information between his ex ante and interim
choice. Therefore, his ex ante maximization problem is the same as his interim max-
imization problem. We only have to show that the Receivers interim best response of
BLL is an interim and ex ante best response given rectangular beliefs. Remember that
ppikmˆ (·) = ρk((·, mˆ)|mˆ) for all mˆ ∈ supp(Π) and that the set of Bayesian updates given Φ0Π or
rect(Φ0Π) are the same. Therefore, the interim best response given the state beliefs of BLL
is an interim best response given rectangular beliefs, as well. Furthermore, we can rewrite
the interim expected utility of the Receiver after observing the message mˆ of Equation 1
as
min
ρ(·|mˆ)∈Bay(rect(Φ0Π)|mˆ)
Eρ(·|mˆ)(u(a, ω)).
His ex ante expected utility is
min
ρ∈rect(Φ0Π)
∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ(Ω, mˆ)Eρ(·|mˆ)(u(a, ω)) dmˆ.
We first show the following relation of ex ante and interim worst case expected utility. Let
ρ∗ denote the ex ante worst case belief given rectangular beliefs. Then,∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ∗(Ω, mˆ)Eρ∗(·|mˆ)(u(a, ω)) dmˆ
=
∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ∗(Ω, mˆ) min
ρ(·|mˆ)∈Bay(rect(Φ0Π)|mˆ)
Eρ(·|mˆ)(u(a, ω)) dmˆ (2)
To proof Equation 2 we first show that the left hand side is greater equal the right hand
side. ∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ∗(Ω, mˆ) Eρ∗(·|mˆ)(u(a, ω))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥min
ρ(·|mˆ)∈Bay(rect(Φ0
Π
)|mˆ) Eρ(·|mˆ)(u(a,ω))
dmˆ
≥
∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ∗(Ω, mˆ) min
ρ(·|mˆ)∈Bay(rect(Φ0Π)|mˆ)
Eρ(·|mˆ)(u(a, ω)) dmˆ
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To proof the other direction, let ρ′(·|mˆ) be the worst case belief given that she observed
mˆ. Then, due to rectangularity, there exist a ρ¯ in rect(Φ0Π) such that ρ
∗ ◦ (ρ′|mˆ)mˆ = ρ¯.
Furthermore rectangularity implies, that ρ¯(·|mˆ) = ρ′(·|mˆ) and ρ¯(Ω, mˆ) = ρ∗(Ω, mˆ) for all
mˆ. ∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ∗(Ω, mˆ)Eρ∗(·|mˆ)(u(a, ω)) dmˆ ≤
∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ¯(Ω, mˆ)Eρ¯(·|mˆ)(u(a, ω)) dmˆ
=
∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ∗(Ω, mˆ)Eρ′(·|mˆ)(u(a, ω)) dmˆ
=
∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ∗(Ω, mˆ) min
ρ(·|mˆ)∈Bay(rect(Φ0Π)|mˆ)
Eρ(·|mˆ)(u(a, ω)) dmˆ
Combining both directions proofs Equation 2. Finally we show that an interim best re-
sponse of the Receiver is an ex ante best response, as well. We denote with aˆmˆ the (Sender
preferred) interim best response of the Receiver given message mˆ, i.e.
min
ρ(·|mˆ)∈Bay(Φ0Π|mˆ)
Eρ(·|mˆ)(u(aˆmˆ, ω)) ≥ min
ρ(·|mˆ)∈Bay(Φ0Π|mˆ)
Eρ(·|mˆ)(u(amˆ, ω))
for any arbitrary amˆ ∈ A and all mˆ ∈ supp(Π). We have to show that (aˆmˆ)mˆ∈supp(Π) is ex
ante optimal. Since ρ(Ω, mˆ) ≥ 0 for all mˆ ∈ supp(Π) and ρ(Ω, mˆ) = 0 for all mˆ /∈ supp(Π),
Equation 2 implies
min
ρ∈rect(Φ0Π)
∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ(Ω, mˆ)Eρ(·|mˆ)(u(amˆ, ω)) dmˆ
= min
ρ∈rect(Φ0Π)
∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ(Ω, mˆ) min
ρ′(·|mˆ)∈Bay(Φ0Π|mˆ)
Eρ(·|mˆ)(u(amˆ, ω)) dmˆ
≤ min
ρ∈rect(Φ0Π)
∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ(Ω, mˆ) min
ρ(·|mˆ)∈Bay(Φ0Π|mˆ)
Eρ(·|mˆ)(u(aˆmˆ, ω)) dmˆ
= min
ρ∈rect(Φ0Π)
∫
mˆ∈A∪b(A)
ρ(Ω, mˆ)Eρ(·|mˆ)(u(aˆmˆ, ω)) dmˆ
for any arbitrary (amˆ)mˆ∈supp(Π).
Hence, Receivers ex ante best response equals the interim best response and the interim
equilibrium of Beaucheˆne, Li, and Li (2019) satisfies ex ante optimality.
4 Discussion
4.1 Endogenous Ambiguity in Cheap Talk
Kellner and Le Quement (2018) show that in a cheap talk setting an ambiguous strategy of
the Sender can lead to an interim equilibrium that improves the ex ante expected payoff of
Sender and Receiver. Similar to the Ambiguous persuasion setting, the equilibrium strat-
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egy of the Receiver is not ex ante optimal in the setting of Kellner and Le Quement (2018).
However, similarly to the procedure described above defining beliefs and rectagularity over
the full state space leads to a dynamically consistent equilibrium with the same strategies
as in the interim equilibrium of Kellner and Le Quement (2018).
We have shown, that taking the full state space and the dependence of risky states
and ambiguous signals into account, allows a definition of rectangular beliefs that leads
to dynamically consistent behavior and still maintains the results of BLL and Kellner and
Le Quement (2018). Therefore, ambiguity induces new equilibria in persuasion and cheap
talk settings even if the players behave dynamically consistent.
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